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Near-Term Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets 
Raymond J. Kopp 
Abstract 
At the present time no widely accepted temporal emissions path for greenhouse 
gases has been developed and adopted at either a country or a global level. What does 
exist is a set of near-term, country-level emissions targets associated with the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and a process for the determination of targets 
for subsequent commitment periods. However, the first commitment period targets 
specified by the protocol have been heavily criticized on the grounds that they are 
arbitrary and ad hoc. The purpose of this paper is to examine the conceptual foundations 
upon which one might base a domestic climate policy for the United States and to attempt 
to determine whether a near-term emissions target can indeed be derived from structured 
decisionmaking resting upon these conceptual foundations. 
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 Near-Term Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets 
Raymond J. Kopp∗ 
Introduction 
Both domestic and international policies designed to reduce the threat of global climate 
change do so by limiting the atmospheric emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases.1 Perhaps 
the two most important design elements within such policies are the amount by which 
greenhouse gases are reduced and the time frame over which such reductions take place. 
One can imagine a hypothetical policy where all greenhouse gas emissions are eliminated 
immediately. Such a policy would surely reduce the threat of global climate change, but the 
severity of the limitation on emissions combined with the immediacy of their reduction would 
come at great global economic cost. On the other hand, a business-as-usual policy requiring no 
reductions in greenhouse gases now or in the future would have no economic cost, but would do 
little or nothing to reduce the threat of global climate change. 
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 
1992) states the objective of the Framework is “to achieve the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”2 
Article 2 also states that such a concentration level should be achieved within a time 
frame that “enables economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” Many interpret 
this last phrase to suggest that stabilization of greenhouse gases should be undertaken in a 
                                                 
∗ Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future. The author wishes to thank Richard Richels for providing data from 
MERGE model runs and Billy Pizer for valuable comments throughout the preparation of this paper. All errors and 
omisions remain the responsibility of the author. 
 
1 There is a second set of important policies associated with global climate change. These policies concern the 
adaptation of both natural and man-made systems to a changed climate. While important, these policies are not 
considered in this paper. 
2 See page 9 UN 1992. 
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manner that would not disrupt the global economy (see Wigley 2000) and therefore some 
balancing of climate and economic systems is envisaged. 
The challenge is to design a policy that chooses a temporal path of emissions reductions 
balancing the economic cost of those actions against the reduced threat of global climate 
change.3 This temporal path specifies annual emissions rates beginning with the present and 
extending into the future until concentrations have been stabilized at the desired level. 
At the present time no widely accepted temporal emissions path has been developed and 
adopted at either a country or a global level. What does exist is a set of near-term, country-level 
emissions targets associated with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and a 
process for the determination of targets for subsequent commitment periods.4 However, the first 
commitment period targets specified by the protocol have been heavily criticized on the grounds 
they are arbitrary and ad hoc and inconsistent with notions of economic efficiency, failing to 
balance economic costs with threats to the global climate system as required by Article 2 of the 
Framework Convention. These critics argue in favor of a process giving rise to both near-term 
emissions targets and full temporal emissions paths based upon an approach that would avoid 
arbitrary and ad hoc decisionmaking and ensure the targets meet the requirements of economic 
efficiency.5 
The construction of emission targets based on a sound conceptual framework, and 
guaranteeing economic efficiency is a laudable goal. However, it is not immediately  
apparent that the difficult problem of domestic climate policy formulation lends itself to  
this type of rigorous construction. The scientific and economic uncertainties inherent in the 
problem of climate change may be so great that they represent an insurmountable barrier to  
the use of “structured decisionmaking.” 
                                                 
3 The balancing may be conducted in an analytic manner providing information and analysis to decisionmakers to be 
used in the political process giving rise to policy recommendations, or the balancing may be conducted entirely 
within a political process without the benefit of formal analysis. 
4 See UN 1997. 
5 There are six greenhouse gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol—carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). The most important of these is 
carbon dioxide, and the topic of this paper concerns near-term targets for the emission of carbon dioxide. 
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The purpose of this short paper is to examine the conceptual foundations upon which one 
might base a domestic climate policy for the United States and to attempt to determine whether a 
near-term emissions target can indeed be derived from structured decisionmaking. 
Conceptual Approaches 
There are two approaches one can take in the development of a near-term policy when 
specifying an initial greenhouse gas emissions target and a path of future reductions. The first of 
these approaches is standard cost-benefit analysis as employed in federal environmental 
policymaking.6 Cost-benefit analysis is the explicit balancing of the costs of a policy against its 
benefits. It is through this explicit balancing that cost-benefit analysis is able to provide both a 
greenhouse gas goal and a mechanism by which to choose among approaches to attain the goal. 
In contrast to cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis takes the goal as given and 
focuses on the least-cost mitigation strategy. The balancing of costs and benefits takes place in a 
prior political setting where decisionmakers choose the goal and employ cost-effectiveness 
analysis to develop a policy to meet the goal.7 While cost-effectiveness analysis takes the goal as 
given, such analysis is relevant to our current problem of setting a near-term greenhouse gas 
target since a near-term target can be derived from a given long-term goal such as a greenhouse 
gas concentration level. 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Article 2 of the Framework Convention suggests the use of cost-effectiveness analysis. 
The Article provides a target, albeit a vague one, and states the time frame over which the target 
is achieved should mitigate the impact the reductions in emissions would have on global 
economies, suggesting emissions mitigation policies that are economically efficient, that is,  
cost-effective. 
One can establish a near-term greenhouse gas emissions target for the United States using 
the guidance provided by the Framework Convention. Such a process would involve the 
                                                 
6 Pros and cons of cost-benefit analysis as a decisionmaking tool for the development of public policy are discussed 
in Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman (Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman 1997). 
7 One can imagine an iterative process where the target is set politically and the costs then assessed using formal 
cost-effectiveness analysis. Once the costs are known, the political process reassesses the target. 
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following steps. First, one must translate the vague notion of a greenhouse gas concentration 
level that would “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” into a 
numeric concentration that would be achieved at some point in the future.8 A defined 
concentration level defines a “carbon budget,” that is, the total amount of carbon that may be 
emitted into the atmosphere consistent with the desired concentration target.  
The next step is to determine the optimal allocation of that carbon budget over time. One 
can examine a range of alternative intertemporal global emission paths capable of achieving the 
desired concentration level. Each of these paths is subjected to an economic analysis that 
determines which path reaches the target at least cost. Once the least-cost path is known, we have 
defined the temporal path of global emissions (or emissions reductions) that is consistent with 
achieving the target at least cost. 
The annual emissions targets derived from the least-cost path are global. In other words, 
they are aggregate targets for the world as a whole. To know the target that pertains to the United 
States, the aggregate global emissions must be divided among all emissions sources (countries). 
Some speak of this allocation of emissions as “burden sharing,” but this is not correct. Burden 
sharing relates to the distribution of control costs, however, the distribution of control costs does 
not necessarily coincide with the distribution of emissions. That is, a country or region bearing 
the greatest financial burden may emit relatively large amounts of greenhouse gases but pay for 
greenhouse gas control in other countries where the cost of control is cheaper. Burden sharing 
can be thought of as the allocation of emission “rights” while the actual pattern of emissions will 
likely be determined by the economics of control cost. 
A small literature has developed that attempts to perform the burden sharing allocation 
under an “equity-fairness” paradigm. 9 The dominant equity-fairness approach is based on an 
equilibrium condition where carbon emissions per capita are equilibrated across all countries at 
some point in time. This approach is known as “contraction and convergence”—implying 
contraction of emissions over time, converging to equal per capita shares at some point in the 
future. This approach clearly has notions of fairness attached, but is viewed by some as 
unrealistic since it does not match the benefits of a mitigation program with the costs incurred for 
                                                 
8 Page 9 UN (1992). 
9 Some of the very difficult international policy issues involved in burden sharing are addressed in the recent book 
by Scott Barrett (Barrett 2003). 
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a particular country. Moreover, the literature remains relatively silent with respect to the speed 
with which per capita carbon emissions should approach the desired equilibrium condition. 
Unfortunately, as noted above burden sharing provides little or no information regarding 
the ultimate distribution of emissions. Thus, even if one were to accept contraction and 
convergence does not help us determine the paths of the U.S. emissions consistent with a 
stabilization goal. Given the global cost of achieving a stabilization target, one can imagine that 
the world will seek to attain this goal at least cost. This implies that the greatest carbon 
reductions will take place in those portions of the world where they are least costly. Therefore, to 
determine the path of U.S. emissions consistent with a particular stabilization target one must 
allocate the global emissions to countries on the basis of the cost of control within each country. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis is a flexible and powerful tool that can be used to both set emissions 
reduction goals as well as evaluate the economic efficiency of alternative means of attaining 
those goals. In its simplest form the application of cost-benefit analysis to the problem of climate 
policy formulation has two components. The first component involves an analysis of the cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, while the second component pertains to a similar analysis 
that quantifies in dollar terms the damage to the climate system caused by accumulating 
greenhouse gases.  
Cost-benefit analysis can be explained with the aid of Figure 1 where the dollars of cost 
and benefit of greenhouse gas emissions reductions are measured on the vertical axis and the 
tons of reduced emissions on the horizontal. Generally speaking, the cost of the first few tons of 
reduction (on a per ton basis) is low, but then rises as the volume of reductions grows. The task 
facing the cost-benefit analyst is to move along the cost of emissions reduction curve to the point 
where the cost of an additional ton of greenhouse gas reduction is exactly equal to the dollar 
amount of the damage (the measure of benefits) that additional ton would cause to the climate 
system. At this point the marginal cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is exactly equal to 
the marginal benefit (in terms of reduced damage to the climate system) of reducing those 
emissions and thus defines the optimal emissions reduction target. 
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The use of cost-benefit analysis in the development of climate policy is complicated by 
the very long-run nature of the problem and the policy actions required (extending 50 to 100 
years). Over this time frame we expect new information on both costs and benefits to be made 
available to decisionmakers leading to reevaluations of both long-term and short-run emissions 
reduction goals. 
Implementation 
A Near-Term Target Using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
As described above, using cost-effectiveness analysis to determine a near-term carbon 
reduction target for the United States begins with the numerical quantification of the desired 
concentration limit. Unfortunately, no body of scientific information exists that permits us to 
assign a numeric greenhouse gas atmospheric concentration to the goals articulated in Article 2 
of the Framework Convention. 
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That is not to say no opinion exists regarding concentration levels. Current CO2 
concentrations are believed to be in the range of 375 ppm, in contrast to preindustrial 
concentrations of 280 ppm. Many in the environmental community argue strongly for a global 
target not exceeding 450 ppm. However, greenhouse gas concentrations in the neighborhood of 
500-550 ppm (representing about a doubling of preindustrial concentrations) have been used in 
many climate policy scenario analyses, including the “Mitigation” volume of the Third 
Assessment Report produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001)10, and 
continue to be the dominant concentration used for scenario analysis.11 Lacking any firmer basis 
for the choice of concentration, the analysis contained in this paper utilizes a 550 ppm global 
long-term stabilization target.12  
There have been several modeling exercises over the past few years designed to produce 
intertemporal regional and global greenhouse gas emissions paths consistent with stabilization at 
550 ppm. Many of these analyses have been reported in the IPCC Third Assessment Report and 
three more are available in a special issue of the Energy Journal published in 1999. For our 
purposes, only those analyses conducted with the goal of modeling “optimal” emissions paths, 
that is, emissions paths that achieve the 550 ppm and concentration at least cost, are relevant. 
Perhaps the most often cited modeling results yielding optimal emissions paths are those 
produced by the MERGE model authored by Alan Manne and Richard Richels (1995, 1999). The 
results contained in Manne and Richels (1999) describe a global emissions path that rises to 
approximately 10 gigatons of carbon by the year 2030, remains relatively flat from 2030 to 2050, 
and then declines.  
As will become evident, the precise volume of peak global emissions—approximately 10 
gigatons in the case of Manne and Richels (1999)—is not as important as the time frame in 
which the emissions need to peak to hit the 550 ppm target.13 It is comforting to note that the 
                                                 
10 The IPCC caveats its use of 550 ppm with the following footnote, “the selection of 550 ppm scenarios is based on 
the relatively large number of available studies that use this level and does not imply any endorsement of this 
particular level of CO2 concentration stabilization.” Page 117, Volume III. 
11 See for example Pacala and Socolow 2004. 
12 The cost-effectiveness analysis described below may be repeated using any desired concentration level. Lower 
concentration levels would give rise to more aggressive near-term carbon dioxide reduction targets. 
13 As a point of reference, global emissions peak at slightly less that 10 gigatons at 2050 in Tol (1999) and rise to 
just over 12 gigatons in 2050 in Peck and Teisberg (1999). 
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other two models analyzing a 550 ppm stabilization scenario in the Energy Journal special issue 
(Peck and Teisberg 1999,Tol 1999) depict emission peaks in 2030–2040 time frame as well. 
Generally speaking, all three models depict an emissions stabilization path requiring 
relatively small deviations from global business as usual (BAU) until 2020. Up to this point 
reductions from BAU emissions on the order of 2% or 4% annually are sufficient to remain on 
the path. In the Manne and Richels (1999) analysis required reductions grow beyond 2020 and 
by 2050 require significant reductions of 30% or more from BAU. 
It is important to recognize that the precise character of the optimal emissions path 
leading to a 550 ppm stabilization is model dependent. Other models, even those constructed 
along the same analytical lines as MERGE, may yield different results, suggesting more or less 
aggressive near-term carbon reduction goals in order to meet a 550 ppm concentration target. 
However, there is a consensus among models generating economically efficient optimal 
emissions paths leading to stabilization goals. Results from these models generally suggest small 
emissions reductions in the early years and increasingly larger reductions in the later years.  
Given a global emissions path, our next task is to develop a comparable path for the 
United States. As suggested above all burden sharing schemes recognize that the item to be 
allocated is in some sense simply allowable emissions of greenhouse gases—not the actual 
emissions. Actual emissions will take place in those countries where the cost of mitigation is the 
highest and these countries will in one way or another “purchase” allowable emissions from 
countries where the cost of mitigation is low. Therefore, even if we employed a contraction-and-
convergence approach to determine allowable U.S. emissions, it would not specify actual 
emissions and therefore not be of great value in attempting to set near-term targets. 
Since the United States is the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases and will likely 
remain so for quite some time, a reasonable simplifying assumption would be to presuppose that 
the pattern of annual U.S. emissions will follow the general shape of the global 550 ppm 
emissions stabilization path. Under this assumption required reductions in U.S. emissions will be 
small in the early years from 2000 to 2020, but will become significantly larger in the 2020 to 
2050 time period and beyond. 
Table 1 summarizes the time path of emissions for the next century under a 550 ppm 
stabilization scenario. The first row represents historical and forecasted global emissions of 
carbon under BAU conditions, while the second row describes carbon emissions under the 550 
ppm stabilization. Data for both of these rows is derived from Manne and Richels (1999). The 
third row depicts BAU emissions for the United States. Data from 1990–2050 is drawn from the 
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2004 International Energy Outlook.14 The fourth row depicts a U.S. 550 stabilization path where 
the U.S. fraction of global emissions is constant (at about 22%) over the next century. The fifth 
row is the reduction in U.S. emissions (in millions of tons) between BAU and the 550 path, while 
the final row is the percent difference in U.S. emissions between BAU and the 550 path.15 
 
Table 1: Emissions Paths for 550 PPM Stabilization (million metric tons of carbon) 
 
  1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2075 2100
      
Global  BAU  6,024 7,092 8,493 10,138 11,589 12,716 14,051  17,267 19,364
Global  550  6,024 7,092 8,323 9,730 10,520 10,743 10,539 5,931 3,758
US  BAU  1,337 1,578 1,789 2,055 2,361 2,713 3,117 3,581 4,115
US  550  1,337 1,578 1,753 1,972 2,143 2,292 2,338 1,305 827
Reductions 0  0  36 83 218 421 779  2,276 3,288
%  Difference 0% 0% 2% 4% 10% 18% 33%  174% 398%
 
A pictorial representation of the data contained in Table 1 is provided in Figure 2. The 
rising global BAU path is contrasted with the rising and then falling global 550 stabilization path 
and the corresponding 550 U.S. path. 
                                                 
14 Emissions forecasts for the United States and the world are drawn from EIA 2004 b. 
15 The emissions path depicted by the emissions in the 550 row of the table was chosen to match the shape of the 
MERGE model analysis contained in Table 9 of Manne and Richels (1999). 
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Context with which to assess the 550 emissions path portrayed in Table 1 and Figure 2 
may be gained by comparing the required emissions reductions to those of existing domestic 
proposals. The McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 called for U.S. emissions to 
be capped at 2000 levels in 2010.16 If implemented this legislation would require reductions in 
the neighborhood of 800 million metric tons of CO2 in 2010 (equivalent to 220 million tons of 
carbon). Another point of comparison is the Bush administration plan for an 18% improvement 
in greenhouse gas intensity—the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output—
amounting to a 350 million metric ton reduction in CO2 by 2012 (equivalent to 95 million tons of 
carbon).17 The 550 ppm stabilization scenario requires relatively small reductions in 2010 on the 
                                                 
16 McCain-Lieberman excludes residential and agricultural sources of greenhouse gases, as well as any entity 
responsible for less than 10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide per year or its equivalent. Given these exclusions, the 
proposed program still covers more than 70% of all U.S. carbon dioxide and industrial greenhouse gas emissions. 
17 Information on both the McCain-Lieberman Senate legislation and the Bush administration climate policy 
proposals may be found in Pizer and Kopp (2003). 
10 Resources for the Future  Kopp 
order of 36 million tons of carbon—less than the Bush administration and considerably less than 
McCain-Lieberman. 
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the cost of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. However, the federal government has produced reports that can be used to assign 
“ballpark” estimates to the emissions reductions required under the 550 stabilization scenario 
presented in Table 1. In 1998 the Energy Information Agency (EIA) produced a report analyzing 
the cost of Kyoto compliance (EIA 1998). The cost estimates are summarized in Figure 3 
reproduced below. 
Information in that report suggests that the incremental cost of reducing carbon emissions 
by 100 million metric tons annually is on the order of $56 per ton (in 2003 dollars).18 Assuming 
linearity when scaled down to reductions less than 100 million metric tons, the cost of 550 ppm 
stabilization reductions in 2010 would be approximately $20 per metric ton of carbon. In the 
context of a cap-and-trade permit system operating in a manner consistent with the emissions 
paths of the 550 stabilization scenario, one would expect emissions prices to rise from 
approximately $20 in 2010 to $50 by 2020. 
It is important to recognize that the EIA cost estimates could be lower if carbon “offsets” 
were taken into account. These offsets might represent reductions in carbon emissions from 
“qualifying” projects undertaken outside U.S. borders or within the United States, but aimed at 
reducing greenhouse gases other than CO2, such as methane. 
If for political or other reasons one believed the United States must begin to reduce its 
absolute level of emissions before the 2030 to 2050 period suggested in Figure 2, the resulting 
emissions path would require more aggressive reductions in the early years from 2000 to 2025. 
Suppose the United States decided it would act ten years earlier than the rest of world and cause 
its emission of CO2 to peak in 2040. This would shift the Manne-Richels 550 scenario emission 
path in Figure 2 to the left. If we assumed that each year’s annual reductions were to come a 
decade earlier, the reductions in 2010 would be on the order of 83 million tons of carbon (300-
plus tons of CO2) at a cost of $50 per ton of carbon. If the United States accelerated its reduction 
schedule by two decades, the 2010 reductions would be on the order of 218 million tons of 
carbon at a cost of $120 per ton. 
                                                 
18 The original EIA estimate was $50 in $1996. I have used GDP price deflators to convert to $2003. These deflators 
are drawn from Table B-7 in the 2004 Economic Report of the President (CEA 2004). 
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The results of this simple cost-effectiveness analysis are dependent upon three uncertain 
pieces of information. The first piece is the stabilization target that we have taken to be 550 ppm. 
We have made no attempt to suggest that this target is the one most consistent with the goal 
articulated in Article 2 the Framework Convention. However, for a variety of reasons it has 
gained popularity as a scenario to be modeled and one to be used as the basis of discussion. 
The second piece of information is the result of the economic optimization model that 
specifies the least cost emissions path necessary to achieve the desired concentration target. 
Unfortunately, only a handful of models have been created that are capable of performing this 
type of analysis and each model operates under different assumptions. However, as noted above, 
three of these models—Manne and Richels (1999), Peck and Teisberg (1999) and Tol (1999)—
depict the same turning point for peak global emissions, and it is this turning point that matters 
most in setting the near-term target. The third uncertain future of this analysis is the largely ad 
hoc path of U.S. emissions over the next century. 
The last bit of uncertainty concerns U.S. actions. If the United States chooses to “cap” its 
emissions at the same time as the rest of the world (again under the Manne and Richels (1999) 
modeling scenario), our cost-effectiveness analysis suggests that near-term CO2 emissions 
reduction targets for the United States are less than those articulated by the Bush administration 
and Senators McCain and Lieberman. However, if the United States chooses to accelerate its 
reductions by 10 years (reaching an emissions peak in 2030) the near-term reductions are in line 
with the administration. A peak in 2020 yields reductions in line with McCain-Lieberman. 
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Figure 3: EIA Estimates of the Marginal Cost of Carbon Emissions Reduction19 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The second approach, cost-benefit analysis, begins with a clean slate. That is, it does not 
require the specification of a long-term concentration target. Rather, it seeks to establish the 
optimal amount of greenhouse gas emissions mitigation by balancing the cost of mitigation 
against its benefits. In simple terms one can think of a cost-benefit analysis as composed of two 
tasks. One quantifies in dollar terms the damage to the climate system brought forth by an 
incremental (additional ton) emission of greenhouse gas. This information is used to assess the 
“benefits” of emissions reductions by equating the value of the ton of emissions reductions to the 
dollar value of the avoided damage to the climate system. One then establishes the marginal cost 
                                                 
19 Figure 3 reproduced from EIA (1998). 
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of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, that is, the additional cost of reducing emissions by an 
additional ton. 
Integrated Assessment 
Integrated assessment models are capable of generating both marginal benefit and 
marginal cost schedules for greenhouse gas reductions. Given this ability, these models can 
identify optimal (economically efficient) concentrations of greenhouse gases as well as the 
economically efficient emissions paths leading to those concentrations. Obviously, the optimal 
concentrations produced by these models are dependent upon the characterization of benefits and 
costs contained within the models’ structures. 
One of the most well-known and widely used pair of integrated assessment models 
applied to the problem of global climate policy are the DICE (Nordhaus 1992, 1993, and 1994) 
and RICE (Nordhaus and Yang 1996) models produced by William Nordhaus and colleagues. 
These models capture in a consistent and integrated fashion both the cost of greenhouse gas 
control and the benefits that control confers on the climate system. The RICE model was run  
in a full optimization mode (i.e., undertaking a cost-benefit analysis) where a 100-year 
economically efficient emissions path was generated and used to analyze the economic 
efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol.20 
These RICE model “optimal” results describe an emissions path quite different from the 
550 ppm least cost path traced by the MERGE model. The RICE model’s optimal path lies only 
slightly below business as usual. While the 550-ppm MERGE model stabilization path leads to a 
global emissions peak at 10 gigatons of carbon by 2050, the RICE model results provide for 
emissions almost 50% higher at 14.9 gigatons by 2050. In addition, rather than falling from 2050 
to 2100 as suggested by the MERGE model results, emissions in the optimal RICE model 
scenario continue to rise to 20 gigatons by 2100 and concentrations approach 630 ppm. 
The RICE model optimal emissions path does reflect decreased greenhouse gas emissions 
in the near term, but reductions are considerably less than those required by the 550-ppm 
stabilization scenario. By way of comparison, the marginal cost of greenhouse gas control along 
the RICE model optimal emissions path is $4 per ton in 2010 rising to $15 per ton in 2050. In 
                                                 
20 See Nordhaus and Boyer (1999). 
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contrast, the 550-ppm scenario suggests a marginal cost of emission reduction in 2010 of 
approximately $20 per ton.21 
Since the RICE model is balancing marginal costs and marginal benefits along its optimal 
emissions path, the marginal cost of greenhouse gas control depicted by the model in 2010 also 
describes the model’s quantification of the economic benefits of greenhouse gas control, that is, 
in the neighborhood of $4 per ton. 
Benefit Estimation: Market Losses 
The emissions path identified by the RICE model (or any other integrated assessment 
model) depends to a great extent on the model’s characterization of the marginal benefits of 
greenhouse gas emissions control. Therefore, it is important to delve into the research 
underpinning these important benefit estimates. It is also important to recognize at the outset that 
considerable uncertainty exists with respect to these estimates. 
In a recent paper Robert Mendelsohn (Mendelsohn 2003) assembled several independent 
estimates of benefits. These estimates specified in terms of dollars per ton of carbon range from 
$7-$20 per ton over the next decade rising to $10-$30 per ton by 2030.22 Others have found the 
benefits of greenhouse gas control to be significantly greater than those in Mendelsohn’s paper. 
As reported by Mendelsohn in his paper, a recent study about the United Kingdom (Clarkson and 
Deyes 2002) sets the benefits of carbon abatement in the neighborhood of $40 per ton. This 
estimate has its origins in an earlier study conducted for the European Union (Eyre et al. 1997) 
finding the benefits of carbon abatement to be approximately $20 per ton. While there are studies 
showing considerably greater benefits of greenhouse gas control, for example, the same UK 
government study where discount rates were lowered to 1% yielding benefits on the order of 
$100 per ton, the low discount rates used in such studies have been the subject of criticism 
(Pearce 2003). 
                                                 
21 All estimates are in 2003 dollars using the GDP deflator. 
22 According to Mendelsohn these estimates are drawn from the early research conducted prior to 1996. He states in 
his paper that more recent work has concluded the benefits of greenhouse gas control are far less than previously 
thought. Mendelsohn states, “these results imply that the social costs (benefits) of carbon are currently about $1-$2 
per ton. Although they will rise over time as carbon accumulates, there is every reason to expect that the social costs 
of carbon will remain below $10 per ton for the next 30 years.” However, few of these “new”studies have yet been 
published. 
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Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2004) recently analyzed eight studies dating from 1994 
to 1999 of the benefits of greenhouse gas emission reductions. 23 The authors conclude that 
current “central” estimates place the benefits between $25 and $30 per ton of carbon in 2003 
dollars, with an overall range of $17-$72. 
Given our current understanding of the science, if a consensus exists regarding the 
benefits of greenhouse gas control one would expect those estimates to fall in the range of $5-
$30 per ton over the next decade, rising thereafter. This range places the RICE model results at 
the extreme low end of the spectrum. 
Using estimates of the costs of greenhouse gas control provided by the Energy 
Information Agency, benefits in the range of $5-$30 per ton suggests near-term greenhouse 
reduction targets of 10 to 60 million tons of carbon per year (36-220 tons of CO2). The range of 
these estimates overlaps those produced by the previous cost-effectiveness analysis. 
Including Nonmarket Losses 
In a recent paper Manne and Richels (2004) employ their MERGE model in a cost-
benefit analysis of climate policy. Like RICE, MERGE is an integrated assessment model 
capable of balancing costs and benefits and deriving optimal emissions paths. However, unlike 
RICE, Manne and Richels have attempted to incorporate more information on the benefits side 
of the ledger. 
The new paper is an outgrowth of Manne (2004) that addresses some issues of global 
climate policy raised by the Copenhagen Consensus Project.24 In that paper Manne expressed his 
view that the range and character of the benefits of mitigating slow climate change were overly 
narrow and focused on “market losses” such as the avoidance of crop losses, forestry damage, 
shoreline erosion, and so on. Manne argued that there is good reason to believe that market 
losses are not the principal reason to be concerned over climate change. Rather, Manne stated, 
“The more worrisome issue is the type of damage for which there are no market values. The 
‘nonmarket damages’ include human health, species losses and catastrophic risks such as the 
shut-down of the thermohaline circulation in the Atlantic Ocean.” 
                                                 
23 See table 13 of Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2004). 
24 See http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com. 
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In his new paper with Richels, Manne modifies MERGE to include market and 
nonmarket benefits. As far as market damages are concerned, Manne and Richels assume  
that a doubling of CO2 concentrations (over preindustrial levels) would cause a global warming 
of 2.5º C and that this amount of temperature rise would lead to GDP losses of 0.25% in the high 
income nations and to losses of 0.50 % in the low-income nations. 
With respect to nonmarket losses, Manne and Richels assume they would increase 
quadratically with temperature—small losses for small changes in temperature, but increasingly 
larger losses for catastrophic changes. When combined with market losses, MERGE assumes 
that high-income countries would be willing to give up 2% of their GDP to avoid the loss. 
Manne and Richels state that 2% is the total GDP component that is currently devoted by the 
United States to all forms of environmental controls—on solids, liquids, and gases.25 To place 
this assumption in context recall that current U.S. GDP is about $11.5 trillion (BEA 2004). Two 
percent of GDP is $2,000 per U.S. household. The average U.S. household spends about $3,000 
per year on all forms of energy (EIA 2004 a) and the median U.S. household income is $43,300 
(Census 2004).  
MERGE runs termed the “Pareto-optimal” path are based on the above benefits 
assumptions and an explicit balancing of costs and benefits. A sensitivity analysis is performed 
by assuming that instead of 2% of GDP high-income countries were willing to give up 4% of 
GDP to avoid a 2.5º C degree warming. The emissions path associated with these assumptions is 
termed “High WTP” (willingness to pay). Figure 4 is reproduced from Manne and Richels 2004. 
                                                 
25 In low-income countries with a per capita income of $25,000, a region would be willing to spend 1% of its GDP 
to avoid a global temperature rise of 2.5º. At $50,000 or above, the same region would be willing to pay 2%, and at 
$5,000 or below, willingness to pay decreases to virtually nothing.  
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Unfortunately, the Manne and Richels 1999 results are not fully comparable to the 2004 
results due to differences in the reference scenario (specifically, the use of updated data on global 
emissions in the 2004 paper). That said, the shape of the Pareto-optimal path of the 2004 paper is 
very similar to the 550 ppm path of the authors’ 1999 paper. This is particularly true of the early 
portion of the path from 2000 to 2040, the point at which global carbon emissions peak. The 
Pareto-optimal path calls for global emissions reductions from the reference case of 2% in 2010, 
3% in 2020, and 7% in 2030. If these same percentages were applied to the U.S. BAU scenario 
they would suggest 30, 60, and 140 million tons of carbon trimmed from BAU in 2010, 2020, 
and 2030 respectively—very similar to the 550 stabilization path. 
If nonmarket benefits approached the Manne and Richels “High WTP” levels, the 
economically efficient global emissions path would peak 20 years earlier (2020) and represent 
considerably more aggressive reductions in emissions than the 550 ppm stabilization path. 
Negelected Nonuse Value 
To the best of my knowledge, until the recent Manne-Richels paper all studies attempting 
to quantify or employ in their analysis the benefits of reduced greenhouse gas emissions have 
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focused on what economists refer to as “use value.” Use value in the context of global climate 
change refers to all commercial and physical property losses due to an altered climate (market 
losses), plus losses to “nonmarket” goods such as recreational opportunities and other quality of 
life attributes. However, the proper measure of benefits should include “total value” which is 
composed of both use value and “nonuse value.”26  
Nonuse value (sometimes referred to as existence value) is attached to those features of 
natural systems that are valued by humans, but are not directly used by humans. For example, the 
value societies place on the protection of endangered species, even though most members of the 
society have never come in contact with such species, is an example of nonuse value. The desire 
to be good stewards and to pass natural systems on for the enjoyment of future generations 
(termed bequest value) is also a component of nonuse value.  
Techniques for the measurement of total value in the context of the protection of the 
global climate system are available and such studies have been suggested by Kopp and Portney 
(1999), among others. In principle, the existing use value studies would place a floor under the 
benefits estimated using a total value framework. It is difficult to speculate regarding the size of 
the additional benefits that would be associated with the nonuse component of global climate 
change protection without conducting such a study. 
Since Manne and Richels specify nonmarket losses in a very general manner it might be 
argued that the Pareto-optimal and High WTP scenarios employed in the MERGE model capture 
use and nonuse value and thus measure the total benefits of mitigating climate change. Absent 
nonuse value studies, the question of whether 2-4% of GDP is regarded as likely willingness to 
pay on the part of rich nations to mitigate climate change is a matter of opinion. Given the 
current science and public attitudes, it is my opinion this represents an upper bound. 
Caveats 
Both cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis have been employed in this 
paper to produce near-term CO2 abatement targets for the United States. Generally speaking, 
those targets are less aggressive than those of the Kyoto Protocol, the McCain-Lieberman 
Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, and the “intensity” targets of the Bush administration goals. 
                                                 
26See Kopp (1992) for a discussion of total value in the context of benefit-cost analysis. Also see Kopp, Krupnick 
and Toman (1997) 
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However, modeling assumptions that lead to larger marginal benefits of greenhouse gas control, 
e.g., Manne and Richels (2004) or require the United States to act more quickly to reduce 
emissions will yield targets more in line with McCain-Lieberman. 
There are two broad caveats that must be associated with the analysis provided in this 
paper. The first concerns the magnitude of the targets produced by the two methods. The 
magnitude is related to the assumptions, models, and literature chosen for the analysis. Using  
the same analytical approaches, that is, cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis,  
the choice of different assumptions, models, and bodies of literature can give rise to different 
near-term targets. This fact does not represent an indictment of structured decisionmaking, but 
rather, underscores the inherent economic and scientific uncertainty in the analysis. 
The second caveat is perhaps more important. The structure for decisionmaking provided 
for in the two approaches is silent regarding the transition from near-term to middle-term targets. 
While it is possible to trace out economically efficient emissions paths, in the manner of the 
MERGE model, in the real world it is difficult to know what near-term target best positions the 
U.S. social/political/economic system to reach the midterm and long-term goals. As many now 
recognize, stabilization of greenhouse gases at any concentration level requires zero net 
emissions in the future. That requirement translates to a global energy system that is largely 
devoid of carbon emissions (either through carbon capture and sequestration or fully noncarbon 
energy technologies). Perhaps the most important policy implication of the near-term carbon 
target is its ability to incentivize the U.S. economic system to undertake the massive investments 
in research and development necessary to produce the energy system of the future. 
The important point regarding the targets developed in this paper is not the quantity of 
emissions reductions they call for over the next decade, but rather, is the incentive properties 
they provide for future action. The global climate system would likely be no worse off if U.S. 
climate policy provided for few if any emission reductions in the near-term as long as policies 
necessary to generate the R&D and investment paths required by the new energy technologies 
were in place. Unfortunately, we do not know if the near-term targets suggested in this paper will 
provide the necessary incentives for action. 
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